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Deals : The Economic Structure of Business Transactions

By: Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan Subramanian (Author) , Guhan 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Not yet Published

Ksh 3,350.00

Format: Paperback or Softback

ISBN-10: 0674303539

ISBN-13: 9780674303539

Publisher: Harvard University Press

Imprint: Harvard University Press

Country of Manufacture: GB

Country of Publication: GB

Publication Date: Jan 6th, 2026

Publication Status: Forthcoming

Product extent: 176 Pages

Product Classification / Subject(s): Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
Takeovers, mergers & buy-outs
Contract law
Financial law
Business negotiation
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A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.
A successful business deal maximizes value for all parties. Drawing on diverse case studies and decades of experience, Michael Klausner and Guhan Subramanian show how contracting parties can reach that goal through rigorous attention to incentives, information asymmetries, exit terms, moral hazard, and opportunism.

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